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ABSTRACT
The intersection between school discipline andfree speech has sparked
debates over how far a school's authority extends beyond campus. The
internet and the nationwide conversation about cyberbullying have only
magnfied the debate. In Tinker v. Des Moines, the Supreme Court
recognized that students do retain their First Amendment rights while under
the school's authority. The Court then went on to hold that a school can
punish a student for his or her on-campus speech if the speech causes a
substantial or material disruption to school activities or ifthe speech invades
the rights of another student. Whether this test applies to speech made off-
campus was left unanswered, and lower courts were left struggling to supply
a solution. Attempting to answer this question, a few circuit courts have
created their own tests. The Fourth Circuit follows a "nexus" test, the
Eighth Circuit applies a "reasonablyforeseeable" test, and the Ninth Circuit
uses a mixed approach.
While schools are limited in what off-campus speech they can punish,
legislatures can regulate what school districts cannot reach. The North
Carolina legislature passed an anti-bullying statute in 2009. The law was
subsequently struck down as unconstitutional by the North Carolina
Supreme Court in the case State v. Bishop.
This Comment will explore precedent surrounding a school's authority
to punish off-campus speech, highlighting the tests used by the Fourth,
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits. It will advocate that Tinker does not permit a
school to punish an off-campus student speaker when the effects of the speech
make its way on campus. This Comment will then critique specific North
Carolina anti-bullying statutes and propose factors for a law that would
better withstandjudicial scrutiny.
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The history of the law of free expression is one of vindication in cases
involving speech that many citizens may find shabby, offensive, or even
ugly.
- Justice Anthony Kennedy
And whatever the challenges of applying the Constitution to
ever-advancing technology, 'the basic principles of freedom of speech and
the press, like the First Amendment's command, do not vary' when a new
and different medium for communication appears. 2
- Justice Antonin Scalia
INTRODUCTION
Free speech has always been one of the most dearly protected and hotly
litigated rights in our democracy. Public schools play a crucial role in
1. United States v. Playboy Entm't Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 826 (2000).
2. Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011) (quoting Joseph Burstyn,
Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952)).
3. For an in-depth look at the history and development of First Amendment doctrine,
see Erwin Chemerinsky, History, Tradition, the Supreme Court, and the First Amendment, 44
HASTINGS L.J. 901 (1993). See also Bradley C. Bobertz, The Brandeis Gambit: The Making
ofAmerica's "First Freedom," 1909-1931, 40 WM. & MARY L. REv. 557, 559-60 (1999).
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instilling students with an appreciation of free speech. As schools struggle
to handle speech problems on and off campus, they impart an appreciation
of the First Amendment. Schools walk a thin line trying to balance the need
to ensure learning in an orderly school environment with the duty to protect
students' free speech rights.
Increased use of the Internet has only exacerbated free speech issues,
especially the issue of student speech and to what extent a school can punish
a student for her off-campus speech.' While not all off-campus speech
occurs on the Internet, the Internet has made it easier for students to express
unpopular opinions about teachers, administrators, and fellow students in a
way that is permanent and widespread.6 The United States Supreme Court
provided guidance for a school district's authority to punish a student
speaker for on-campus speech in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District,' but it is not clear how far that authority extends
off campus. The question remains: Can a school punish a student when the
effects of the student's off-campus speech find their way onto the school's
campus? Lower courts have come to different conclusions.8
With the lack of authoritative guidance for school discipline of
off-campus speech, state legislatures have attempted to fill this gap by
passing statutes criminalizing certain behavior where Tinker does not apply.
For example, the North Carolina legislature passed laws criminalizing some
speech that might happen solely off campus, such as cyberbullying.9
Anti-bullying statutes, however, have the tendency to run afoul of
constitutional free speech protections, and many have been struck down for
4. See Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1044 (2d Cir.
1979) ("Public education in America enables our nation's youth to become responsible
participants in a self-governing society.").
5. See generally Lee Goldman, Student Speech and the First Amendment: A
Comprehensive Approach, 63 FLA. L. REv. 395 (2011) (analyzing student speech cases and
arguing that student speech that occurs outside school supervision should be treated
differently than on-campus speech); Barry P. McDonald, Regulating Student Cyberspeech,
77 Mo. L. REV. 727 (2012) (arguing that the Tinker standard is inapplicable to student speech
that occurs online).
6. See generally Somini Sengupta, Warily, Schools Watch Students on the Internet, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 29, 2013, at Al.
7. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) ("It can
hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.").
8. Infra Section I.C.
9. Act of Aug. 28, 2009, no. 551, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 1510 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-458.1 (2017)), invalidated by State v. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d 814, 822 (N.C. 2016);
School Violence Prevention Act of 2012, no. 149, § 4, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 715 (codified
as amended at § 14-458.2).
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vagueness.'o This struggle to write constitutional laws in this area presents
another important issue: To what extent can the state criminalize anti-
bullying speech?
There are three categories of student speech: (1) on-campus speech; (2)
off-campus speech that has no effect on campus; and (3) off-campus speech
that has an effect on campus. The first category is covered by Tinker's
"materially and substantially" disruptive test." And courts generally agree
that schools cannot punish speech in the second category. 2 But courts are
split on how to approach the third category. This Comment proposes a
solution for the third category.
Part I of this Comment examines the development of case law involving
the issue of off-campus speech in K-12 schools. It briefly summarizes the
primary cases regarding school speech from various circuit courts, including
recent tests used by the Fourth and Eighth Circuits; it also discusses how the
Ninth Circuit recently refused to pick one test over the other. Part II will
then examine whether Tinker permits a school to punish an off-campus
student speaker when the effects of speech make their way onto campus. Part
1 will critique specific North Carolina anti-bullying statutes that can reach
speech where a school's authority is inconclusive. It argues that the
legislation is unconstitutional and proposes factors for a new law that would
better withstand judicial scrutiny.
I. THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATE-WHAT SPEECH CAN SCHOOLS PUNISH?
The United States Supreme Court established in Tinker when a school
can punish a student speaker for speech on campus.13 Since then, the Court
has created various exceptions to that rule.14 The Supreme Court has not yet
answered, however, whether the same test applies to off-campus speech that
makes its way on campus by someone other than the speaker. This Part will
analyze circuit court precedent on that issue.
10. See, e.g, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.090 (West 2012), invalidated by State v. Vaughn,
366 S.W.3d 513 (Mo. 2012) (en banc); Albany County, N.Y., Local Law No. 11 for 2010
(Nov. 8, 2010), invalidated by People v. Marquan, 19 N.E.3d 480 (N.Y. 2014); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-458.1; see also Letter from Eugene Volokh, Gary T. Schwartz Professor of Law,
UCLA, to U.S. Commission on Civil Rights (May 13, 2011), https://perma.cc/9VK9-ZZRH
(noting generally that anti-bullying statutes are vulnerable for vagueness).
11. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.
12. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404-05 (2007) (reconciling Fraser with
Tinker, the Court recognized that "[h]ad Fraser delivered the same speech in a public forum
outside the school context, it would have been protected").
13. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509-14.
14. See infra Section I.C.
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A. On-Campus Speech
A school district's authority to discipline its students for on-campus
behavior has long been an accepted societal norm.15 The Supreme Court, in
Tinker, addressed how to determine when a student speaker could be
punished for her on-campus speech. 16 In Tinker, a group of students wore
black armbands at school in protest of the Vietnam War.17 The school had a
policy that any student wearing an armband would be asked to remove it."
If the student refused, she would be suspended until she returned without the
armband.' 9 Three students refused to remove their armbands when asked
and were sent home. 20 The students' parents sued the school district for
violating the students' free speech rights. 2 1 The district court dismissed the
case, holding that the school district's actions were reasonable to "prevent
disturbance of school discipline." 2 2 Sitting en banc, a divided Eighth Circuit
upheld the district court's decision.2 3
When the case reached the Supreme Court, the Court held that a public
school policy prohibiting the wearing of armbands in political protest
violated the First Amendment protection of free speech. 24 The seven-to-two
majority stated: "First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special
characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers and
students. It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate." 2 5 Recognizing the school environment's unique character, the Court
ruled that a less stringent standard applies to school officials who seek to
punish on-campus student speech than if the government was regulating
speech in places outside the school.26
15. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 413-16 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing the
historical development of a school's right to discipline students).
16. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
17. Id
18. Id.
19. Id
20. Id
21. Id
22. Id at 505.
23. Id.
24. Id at 514.
25. Id at 506.
26. Id. at 507 ("On the other hand, the Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for
affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with
fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools."). The
holding stated:
7112018]
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The Court created a two-prong test to determine whether a student
speaker can be punished for her on-campus speech. First, the school can
punish any student for speech that "materially" and "substantially" disrupts
school activities.2 7 If that speech would not materially and substantially
interfere with the operation of the school, the speech is beyond the school's
authority-unless the second prong is implicated. If the speech is not
substantially or materially disruptive but invades the rights of another
student, the school can appropriately discipline the student for her speech.28
Soon after Tinker, the Supreme Court began clarifying and creating
exceptions to Tinker's holding. In 1986, the Court held in Bethel School
District Number 403 v. Fraser29 that vulgar, lewd, obscene, and plainly
offensive speech made on campus falls within a school's authority to
discipline without having to prove a substantial or material disruption to the
school environment or an invasion of the rights of another student. 30 Fraser
involved student speech that contained vulgar, offensive, and graphic sexual
undertones. 3 1  Two years after Fraser, the Court carved out another
exception to Tinker in Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier.3 2 The Court allowed the
school principal to censor articles in a student-written, school-sponsored
newspaper that he found inappropriate.33  The Court thereby allowed a
school to punish a student for school-sponsored speech without having to
prove a disruption or invasion of rights.34 Most recently, in 2007, the Court
made another exception to the general Tinker requirements in Morse v.
In order for the State in the person of school officials to justify prohibition of
a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its action was caused
by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness
that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint. Certainly where there is no finding
and no showing that engaging in the forbidden conduct would "materially and
substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school," the prohibition cannot be sustained.
Id at 509 (citing Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (1966)).
27. Id
28. Id at 508. The second part of Tinker is a largely undeveloped area of case law. The
Supreme Court did not expand on it in the opinion, and few courts have applied it since. Meg
Hazel, Students Behaving Badly, S.C. LAW., Sept. 2014, at 38, 40-41.
29. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986) (holding the school
district did not violate the First Amendment by punishing a high school student for giving a
lewd and indecent speech during a school assembly).
30. Id
31. Id at 683.
32. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270-76 (1988) (holding a student
newspaper made during a joumalism class was not a "public forum" and, therefore, was not
under the school's authority).
33. Id. at 273.
34. Id. at 276.
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Frederick- the school can regulate speech promoting illegal drug use.3 ' That
case involved a student holding a banner with the message "BONG HiTS 4
JESUS" during a school-supervised event.36
B. Tinker Meets Online, Off-Campus Speech
While Tinker and its progeny provide workable tests for on-campus
speech, "[w]hether and how these precedents apply to off-campus speech are
questions the Supreme Court has yet to answer." 37 Because the Internet is
pervasive, student posts can jeopardize a school's tight control over its
educational environment. Schools rightfully have an interest in controlling
their environments to promote learning and to shape student values.38
Schools have long been recognized as having in loco parentis authority over
students during the school day.39 However, determining where a school's
ability to punish a speaker for her speech stops and where parental authority
begins is a complicated task.
The type of speech that schools usually seek to discipline further
complicates the issue. Schools often target speech that society frowns upon.
Cyberbullying, 40 threats to harm the school,41 and verbal attacks toward
teachers 42 are the most common types of speech school districts attempt to
35. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007) (holding a school could punish a
student displaying a sign promoting illegal drug use at an off-campus, school-approved field
trip).
36. Id. at 397.
37. C.R. ex rel. Rainville v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 835 F.3d 1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2016).
38. Infra Section I.A.
39. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 413-16 (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing the historical
development of a school's right to discipline students).
40. See, e.g., Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 576-77 (4th Cir. 2011)
(holding that a school could punish a student for creating a MySpace page calling a female
classmate a slut and implying she has a sexually transmitted disease).
41. See, e.g, D.J.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. # 60, 647 F.3d 754, 766 (8th Cir. 2011)
(holding that it was constitutional for a school to punish a student for sending instant messages
to a fellow student threatening to obtain a gun and shoot students at the school); LaVine v.
Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 992 (9th Cir. 2001) (permitting a school district to punish a
student for writing a poem from the perspective of a school shooter and bringing it onto
campus for a teacher to review).
42. See, e.g., Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 400 (5th Cir. 2015)
(permitting a school to punish a student for creating a rap with harassing, intimidating, and
threatening statements regarding teachers he believed were sleeping with students); J.S. ex
rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 941 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (allowing
a school to punish a student for creating a MySpace profile while at home on a weekend that
mocked her middle school principal).
2018] 713
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punish.43 While "[t]he 'basic educational mission' of the school may at times
conflict with the speech rights of its students, 4 the educational mission
should not always trump free speech rights.
The Tinker Court in 1969 could not have foreseen the vast changes in
technology or the role the Internet would play in the lives of students.45
Applying Tinker's substantial and material disruption test to
off-campus speech is like trying to fit a round peg into a square hole, and
lower court opinions on this issue reflect that challenge. Lower courts have
had difficulty determining whether Tinker applies to student speakers when
their speech originates off campus.46 The lack of Supreme Court guidance
on the issue has created problems for schools, attorneys, and students.
Schools are hesitant to punish off-campus student speech, for they are unsure
of whether they are creating potential liability for their actions. 47 Attorneys
are not able to confidently advise their clients, and students are left wary of
what they can and cannot say off campus. 8 The gap left by Tinker has led
to inconsistent outcomes among lower courts.
Earlier opinions declined to apply Tinker to off-campus speech in many
circumstances. For example, in 1979, the Second Circuit did not allow a
school district to punish students for publishing a satirical and sexual
underground newspaper off campus and after school hours. 9 While the
newspaper was composed mainly off campus, a few articles had been written
on school typewriters, and the finished product was secretly stored in a
teacher's closet.50 Despite these "[d]e minimis" contacts with the school, the
Second Circuit held that, because the newspaper was "conceived, executed,
and distributed outside the school," it was off-campus speech and had the
43. See Michael Begovic, Note, Mo Speech Mo Problems: The Regulation of Student
Speech in the DigitalAge and the Fiflh Circuit's Approach in Bell v. Itawamba County School
Board, 84 U. CIN. L. REv. 499, 508-09 (2016).
44. C.R. ex rel. Rainville v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 835 F.3d 1142, 1148 (9th Cir. 2016)
(quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986)).
45. See Bell, 799 F.3d at 392 ("Over 45 years ago, when Tinker was decided, the Internet,
cellphones, smartphones, and digital social media did not exist The advent of these
technologies and their sweeping adoption by students present new and evolving challenges
for school administrators, confounding previously delineated boundaries of permissible
regulations.").
46. See Begovic, supra note 43.
47. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) (providing a cause of action for plaintiffs whose
constitutional rights are violated by state actors); Hazel, supra note 28.
4 8. Id
49. Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1051-52 (2d Cir.
1979).
50. Id at 1050.
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full protection of the First Amendment." Here, the court did not apply
Tinker to the off-campus speech that made its way on campus, even when,
at times, some of the speech originated on campus.
Twenty years later, the Fifth Circuit also declined to apply Tinker to
off-campus speech.5 2 The dispute in Porter v. Ascension Parish School
Board involved a student's picture drawn at home of missiles, helicopters,
and armed assailants attacking the school.53 The drawing made its way onto
the school campus when the student's little brother accidentally showed it to
a teacher two years later.54 The student was expelled and required to enroll
in an alternative school." His mother sued on his behalf."6 The court
considered Fifth Circuit precedent and concluded that the Tinker standard
only "applies to school regulations directed at specific student viewpoints.""
The court further decided that because the student's drawing "was completed
in his home, stored for two years, and never intended by him to be brought
to campus," the speech was considered to be made off campus. 8 Because
the student had no intention to communicate the threat to the school, his
expression was not even "speech directed at the campus." 9
Recent case law diverged from these early cases and expanded the
proverbial schoolhouse gates beyond the physical boundaries of the school.o
For example, in Bell v. Itawamba County School Board, the Fifth Circuit
held the Tinker standard applied to a student's rap video in which he accused
a high school coach of sleeping with students, even though the video was
filmed and posted off campus. 61 The rap video only made its way onto
campus when the coach heard about it from his wife, who had herself heard
about it from a friend, and the coach asked another student to show him the
video on his phone.62 Because Bell's speech was reasonably understood by
school officials to threaten, harass, and intimidate a teacher and, thus, was
51. Id.
52. Porter v. Ascension Par. Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 615 (5th Cir. 2004).
53. Id. at 611.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 612.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 615.
58. Id. ("Given the unique facts of the present case, we decline to find that [the student's]
drawing constitutes student speech on the school premises.").
59. Id.
60. See, e.g., C.R. ex rel. Rainville v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 835 F.3d 1142, 1153 (9th Cir.
2016) (holding that a school may discipline a student for speech that occurred a few hundred
feet off campus at a public park).
61. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 384, 400 (5th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
62. Id. at 385.
2018] 715
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intentionally directed at the "school community," the school could punish
the student for his speech.63
The Bell court expanded Tinker to apply to student speech that
originated and was disseminated off campus and was produced without
school resources. 64 After determining that Bell's speech was within the
reach of Tinker, the court then considered whether Bell's speech created an
actual substantial disruption or if there was a reasonable forecast of a
substantial disruption to the school environment.65 Giving significant
deference to the school board, the court held that because of the threatening
nature of the speech, the specific targeting of a teacher, the objective
seriousness of the speech, and the relationship of the speech to the school, it
was reasonably foreseeable that the speech would create a substantial
disruption on campus.6 6 In dicta, the court described how threatening,
harassing, and intimidating a teacher "impedes, if not destroys, the ability to
educate."
Similarly, the Second Circuit in Wisniewski v. Board of Education of
Weedsport Center School District permitted the school to suspend a student
who, while on his home computer, sent an instant-messaging (IM) icon
depicting his English teacher shot in the head with a pistol.6 8 The IM icon
was sent to fifteen others, including some who attended the same school.69
Like the rap video in Bell, the IM icon only made its way on campus when
another student showed it to a school official.70 In a hearing held to
determine punishment for the student, the school board found the icon to be
a threat to the teacher.71 The Second Circuit affirmed the school official's
broader authority to punish threats and held that in a circumstance where "a
student's expression [can be] reasonably understood as urging violent
conduct, we think the appropriate First Amendment standard is the one set
forth by the Supreme Court in [Tinker]."72 Like the Fifth Circuit, once it was
determined that Tinker applied, the court looked to the facts to see if there
was an actual disruption or if a disruption in the school environment was
reasonably foreseeable. It held, in these circumstances, that a threat to a
63. Id at 396-97.
64. Id at 393.
65. Id at 397-98.
66. Id
67. Id at 399-400.
68. Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of Weedsport Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 36 (2d Cir.
2007).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 36-37.
72. Id at 38.
716 [Vol. 40:2
10
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 10
https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol40/iss2/10
READING, 'RITING, AND REGULATING SPEECH
school official at least creates a strong foreseeability of disruption to the
school environment. The court found it irrelevant whether the student
intended for his IM icon to be communicated to school authorities and
permitted the school district to punish him for his expression.74
The Third Circuit, sitting en banc in JS. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain
School District, assumed for the sake of argument that Tinker can apply to
off-campus speech, but it found the school's actions violated the student's
First Amendment right because there was no substantial or material
disruption to the school environment." In this case, a student was suspended
for creating a fake MySpace profile of her middle school principal while
sitting at home one weekend. 76 The court began by recognizing a school
board's vast, but not unlimited, authority.77  The court assumed Tinker
applied to the speech at issue but refused to make a binding holding on the
question.78 The court refused to determine whether Tinker applied because
it held that there was no disruption to the school environment or any
reasonable belief by a school official of a future disruption caused by the
speech.79 This was because the profile was "so outrageous" that "no one
took its content seriously."80 Moreover, only about twenty-two students
could view the profile, and none of those students accessed the profile while
on campus.8 The only printout of the profile brought onto school grounds
was one a student brought at the principal's request.82 Interestingly, while
the court refused to expressly determine whether Tinker applies to
off-campus speech, it did explicitly hold that Fraser, the lewdness and
vulgarity exception to Tinker, does not apply to off-campus speech.8 3
73. Id. at 39-40.
74. Id at 40.
75. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 926, 929-30 (3d Cir.
2011) (en banc).
76. Id. at 92(-21.
77. Id at 925-26.
78. Id at 926 ("The Supreme Court established a basic framework for assessing student
free speech claims in Tinker, and we will assume, without deciding, that Tinker applies to
J.S.'s speech in this case.").
79. Id at 928.
80. Id. at 921.
8 1. Id
82. Id
83. Id at 932 ("The School District's argument fails at the outset because Fraser does
not apply to off-campus speech. Specifically in Morse, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the
majority, emphasized that '[h]ad Fraser delivered the same speech in a public forum outside
the school context, it would have been protected."' (quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S.
393, 405 (2009))).
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Judge Smith of the Third Circuit wrote a concurrence, joined by four
other judges, in which he argued Tinker does not apply to any off-campus
speech.8 4 He asserted, "[T]he First Amendment protects students engaging
in off-campus speech to the same extent it protects speech by citizens in the
community at large." 5 Judge Smith noted various decisions by the Supreme
Court discussing the dichotomy between on-campus and off-campus speech,
writing, "If Tinker and the Court's other school-speech precedents applied
to off-campus speech, this discussion would have been unnecessary." 8 6 Even
the Tinker decision itself was "expressly grounded in 'the special
characteristics of the school environment,"' Judge Smith wrote." Regarding
policy, he argued that applying Tinker to off-campus speech would
dangerously increase a school's power to regulate any student's expressive
activity that somehow caused substantial disruption at school-regardless of
where the speech took place, the subject matter of the speech, or whether the
student intended that speech to reach campus. 8 Further, "if Tinker were
applied to off-campus speech, there would be little reason to prevent school
officials from regulating adult speech" that caused a substantial disruption
on campus.89 Despite his firm stance against applying Tinker to off-campus
speech, Judge Smith agreed that any speech "intentionally directed towards
a school" is on-campus speech regardless of its origin. 90 This would include,
for example, an email to a school employee sent on a home computer. In
light of First Amendment precedent, Judge Smith wrote, "We must tolerate
thoughtless speech like [the student's] in order to provide adequate breathing
room for valuable, robust speech-the kind that enriches the marketplace of
ideas, promotes self-government, and contributes to self-determination."91
C. Development of Tests to Determine Whether Tinker Applies
Amidst the confusion and lack of uniformity, the Fourth and Eighth
Circuits have developed tests to determine when Tinker will apply to
84. Id at 936 (Smith, J., concurring).
85. Id.
86. Id at 937-38 (discussing, inter alia, the exceptions found in Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and
Morse).
87. Id at 937 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969)).
88. Id at 939.
89. Id. at 940.
90. Id.
91. Id at 941.
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off-campus speech.92 The Fourth Circuit applies a "nexus" test, examining
how closely related the speech is to the school. The Eighth Circuit, on the
other hand, applies a "reasonably foreseeable" test, wherein the court asks if
it is reasonably foreseeable that the offending speech will reach the school. 94
Recently, the Ninth Circuit applied both tests and refused to pick one over
the other.95
1. The Fourth Circuit's "Nexus" Test
The Fourth Circuit case, Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools, centered
around a fake MySpace profile of a fellow student. 96 High school senior
Kara Kowalski created a MySpace page entitled "S.A.S.H.," an acronym for
"Students Against Shay's Herpes."" After Kowalski made the profile, she
invited approximately 100 people to join the group. The school suspended
Kowalski, and her parents responded with a lawsuit against the school
district.99 The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the school
district because Kowalski's webpage was "created for the purpose of inviting
others to indulge in disruptive and hateful conduct [causing an] in-school
disruption."o
The Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's decision and set out a
nexus test for determining whether Tinker applies. 10 ' This test examines the
nexus of the speech to the school's "pedagogical interests" and then
determines whether the school's interest "was sufficiently strong to justify
the action taken by school officials in carrying out their role as the trustees
of the student body's well-being."10 2 The court held that if the Internet was
used to specifically target another student, the speech was sufficiently
connected to the school environment.' Additionally, under these
circumstances, the MySpace page was both materially and substantially
92. See C.R. ex rel. Rainville v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 835 F.3d 1142, 1150-53 (9th Cir.
2016); S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee's Summit R-7 Sch. Dist., 696 F.3d 771, 777-78 (8th Cir.
2012); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 573 (4th Cir. 2011).
93. Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 573.
94. S. W., 696 F.3d at 777-78.
95. CR., 835 F.3d at 1150-52.
96. Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 567.
97. Id
98. Id
99. Id
100. Id
101. Id at 573-74.
102. Id at 573.
103. Id
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disruptive to the school environment and collided with the rights of others as
set out in Tinker.10 4
2. The Eighth Circuit's "Reasonably Foreseeable" Test
The Eighth Circuit case, SJ W ex rel. Wilson v. Lee's Summit R-7
School District, concerned an online blog created by two students.10 5 The
Wilson twins were juniors in high school when they created an Internet blog
that contained many racist and sexually degrading comments about specific
classmates.106 The Wilsons claimed they created the public website to
"discuss, satirize, and 'vent' about events at [their high school]."107 The
school district suspended the Wilsons for 180 days, and the parents sued on
the boys' behalf.108 The district court granted a preliminary injunction in
favor of the Wilsons, delaying any suspension.109 At the hearing for the
preliminary injunction, the Wilsons claimed the website was merely
satirical.110 The school district offered evidence to show that the discovery
of the blog caused an actual and "substantial disruption" at the school and
that numerous school computers were used to access or attempt to access the
blog.111 Teachers testified they had trouble controlling their classrooms
when students found out about the Internet post.1 12 The incident also caused
the media and students' parents to contact the school, further disrupting the
school environment. 13 Despite deciding in favor of the Wilsons, the district
court found that the blog was "targeted at" the high school.1 14
The Eighth Circuit held that the district court erred in granting a
preliminary injunction because the findings of fact did not support the relief
granted. 15 The court held that Tinker applied "to off-campus student speech
where it is reasonably foreseeable that the speech will reach the school
community and cause a substantial disruption to the educational setting."116
104. Id at 573-74.
105. S.J.W. ex rel. Wilson v. Lee's Summit R-7 Sch. Dist, 696 F.3d 771, 773 (8th Cir.
2012).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id
109. Id.
110. Id. at 774.
111. Id
112. Id
113. Id.
114. Id. at 775.
115. Id at 776.
116. Id at 777. The Second Circuit has also supported this analytical framework. See
Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting its previous determination "that
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Here, because it was reasonably foreseeable that the blog would reach the
school's campus, especially since it discussed other students at the school,
the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's preliminary injunction. 17
3. The Ninth Circuit's Use of the "Nexus" and "Reasonably
Foreseeable" Tests
In September 2016, the Ninth Circuit applied both the Fourth and
Eighth Circuit's tests but refused to adopt one over the other."' Unlike
Kowalski and Lee's Summit, C.R. ex rel. Rainville v. Eugene School District
4J did not involve the Internet. A school punished a seventh-grade student,
C.R., and two other seventh-grade boys for teasing two disabled sixth graders
while on the walk home from school.' 19 The students walked on a path
several hundred feet from the school's property line. 120 The older students'
jokes to the sixth-grade students escalated and soon became sexual in
nature. 121 An instructional aide in the school district witnessed C.R. and the
older students teasing the younger ones. 122 The aide broke up the group and
finished walking the two disabled students home. 123 The next day, she called
and reported the incident to the school.124 After interviewing the students
involved, the school determined that "the incident fell within the School
District's definition of sexual harassment and that C.R. had participated in
that harassment." 12 5 C.R. received a two-day suspension.1 26 His parents sued
the School District on his behalf.127
The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the school
district. 128 The Ninth Circuit presented its analysis in the form of two issues:
(1) "whether the school could permissibly regulate the student's off-campus
a student may be disciplined for expressive conduct, even conduct occurring off school
grounds, when this conduct 'would foreseeably create a risk of substantial disruption within
the school environment,' at least when it was similarly foreseeable that the off-campus
expression might also reach campus." (quoting Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ. of the Weedsport
Cent. Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 2007))).
117. S. W. ex. rel. Wilson, 696 F.3d at 778, 780.
118. C.R. ex rel. Rainville v. Eugene Sch. Dist. 4J, 835 F.3d 1142, 1150-53 (9th Cir.
2016).
119. Id at 1146.
120. Id
121. Id
122. Id
123. Id
124. Id.
125. Id at 1147.
126. Id
127. Id
128. Id. at 1146.
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speech at all"; and (2) "whether the school's regulation of the student's
speech complied with the First Amendment's requirements."l2 9 The court
affirmed the district court's judgment.13 0
The Ninth Circuit applied both the "nexus" test and the "reasonably
foreseeable" test to the first part of the analysis-whether the school could
permissibly regulate the off-campus speech at all. In applying the Fourth
Circuit's nexus test, the court reasoned that the sexual harassment was
"closely tied to the school" considering that all participants were students,
the incident took place on a path that started on school grounds, there was no
visual marker to show where the school property ended and where it began,
and the school's schedule was what brought the students together on the
path.13 1 Applying the Eighth Circuit's reasonably foreseeable test, the court
held the school district's discipline was proper because "administrators could
reasonably expect the harassment's effects to spill over into the school
environment."1 3 2 The school offered no evidence of an actual disruption on
school grounds.1 3 3 However, the court held it was enough that the students
could run into each other in the hallway or that the harassed students would
likely discuss it with other students for the administrators to reasonably
expect a disturbance in the school environment.1 34
Next, the circuit court evaluated the school district's two-day
suspension under Tinker.' 3  The court held that because sexual harassment
de facto interferes with another student's "ability to feel safe and secure at
school," the suspension was permissible.'"'
Under both the Fourth and Eighth Circuits' tests, the court came to the
same conclusion: Tinker applied. The court was not inclined to pick one test
over the other when both analyses led to the same conclusion. The Ninth
Circuit's decision demonstrates just how broad both tests are: regardless of
which test is used, both are extensive enough that most of the time the result
will be the application of the Tinker standard, which is less protective of
speech. While a "nexus" test in theory may be more expansive than the
reasonably foreseeable test-as students' lives are usually centered around
school so that almost everything in their lives will have some sort of "nexus"
129. Id at 1148.
130. Id at 1146.
131. Id at 1150-51.
132. Id at 1151.
133. Id (noting only what disruptions administrators could "reasonably expect" at school
but failing to point to any actual disruptions in the school environment).
134. Id
135. Id at 1152.
136. Id. at 1153.
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with the school environment-no case has yet shown how one test results in
the application Tinker while the other does not.
Kowalski, Lee's Summit, and Eugene School District, along with cases
discussed earlier, show the shift in favor of applying the Tinker test to
off-campus student speech. Whether this shift is because courts believe
Tinker to be the best standard or because it is the only Supreme Court
precedent regarding school speech is unclear. With the increasing
integration of technology in students' everyday lives, these types of cases are
not going away, and a consistent test would benefit students, school districts,
and attorneys.
II. DOES TINKER ALLOW SCHOOLS TO PUNISH AN OFF-CAMPUS STUDENT
SPEAKER WHEN THE EFFECTS OF HER SPEECH CAUSE A DISRUPTION ON
CAMPUS?
While Tinker is not impermissibly restrictive of free speech when
applied to on-campus speech, it becomes too restrictive when applied outside
the schoolhouse gates. Because "[fjree speech encourages stability,
neutrality, and restraint from tyranny, corruption, and ineptitude," it is better
to err on the side of free speech and not apply the Tinker rule beyond
on-campus speech.m3
Applying Tinker to off-campus speech is a dangerous choice for two
reasons. First, it would vastly expand a school's power to punish student
speech. This could create a slippery slope that greatly restricts all student
speech. The line between off-campus and on-campus speech could become
hopelessly blurred. If the location of the student's speech and the student's
intention for the speech not to reach the school do not matter, the school
would have the power to punish almost anything the student says. For
example, think about two young girls at a sleepover where one says to the
other, "Sharon's fat." The girl makes the comment sitting in her own room
and in confidence, never intending for the friend to share her comment or for
the comment to make its way to school. The next day, the friend tells
everyone about the girl's comment regarding Sharon. It causes an uproar
among the students, and Sharon is deeply upset. If Tinker applied to this
speech, the school could permissibly punish the girl for a comment she made
while at a sleepover. Or, take for example the neighborhood bully who
137. Lily M. Strumwasser, Testing the Social Media Waters: First Amendment
Entanglement Beyond the Schoolhouse Gates, 36 CAMPBELL L. REv. 1, 5 (2013); see also J.S.
ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 941 (3d Cir. 2011) (Smith, J.,
concurring) ("We must tolerate thoughtless speech like [the student's] in order to provide
adequate breathing room for valuable, robust speech-the kind that enriches the marketplace
of ideas, promotes self-government, and contributes to self-determination.").
7232018]
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intimidates other kids in the neighborhood. He also could be punished for
his speech that takes place solely in the neighborhood.
Second, allowing schools to punish off-campus speakers would create
a chilling effect on student speech, especially speech that engages in political
or other controversial matters. Oftentimes, political and controversial speech
creates a substantial and material disruption on campus, but that does not
mean a student should be punished for expressing her beliefs. For instance,
a student could post her views against the state recognizing gay marriage
while off campus on a private blog. This blog could be read by, and would
likely be read by, her student peers. Her views could create a material and
substantial disruption to the school environment: it could spark protests,
cause other students to harass her, or beget a variety of other events. A
school's punishment for this off-campus speech would dilute almost all of
the student's First Amendment rights. Having the same standard for on-
campus and off-campus speech strips students of any permissible outlet to
share their thoughts and ideas, however offensive or uncivil they may be.
"[R]estrictions on on-campus speech can at least be defended on the grounds
that the students remain free to speak elsewhere," but if Tinker applies to
off-campus speakers, as well, it effectively strips students of alternative
channels to express themselves.' 39
The Fourth Circuit's nexus test and the Eighth Circuit's foreseeability
test are insufficient to determine whether an off-campus speaker can be
punished for her speech. Both are too broad in their stroke.1 4 0 As noted by
Judge Smith for the Third Circuit, "A bare foreseeability standard could be
stretched too far, and would risk ensnaring any off-campus expression that
happened to discuss school-related matters."l 41 The same goes for a nexus
test, especially given that a student's life centers around school. Most
students spend about five-to-six hours at school for five days a week.
Activities and friend groups often stem from the school environment. It is
unreasonable to think that most of a student's conversations will not involve
something about the school environment. Because both tests are broad, there
is a risk that they can be arbitrarily applied. One judge might think speech
would foreseeably reach a school or has a sufficient nexus to the school while
another might not. Under either test, teachers, attorneys, and students are
left as confused and unsure as they were before Tinker extended beyond the
physical premises of schools.
138. See Letter from Eugene Volokh, supra note 10.
139. Id.
140. J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 940 (Smith, J., concurring).
141. Id
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A school should be permitted to punish an off-campus student speaker
when the effects of that speech cause a substantial and material disruption
on campus. Adult speech may just as well materially disrupt public schools,
but the adult is not subject to discipline by the school district.1 42 There
should be two exceptions to this general rule, however. First, a school should
be permitted to punish a student for speech intentionally directed at the
school. For example, this would include an email sent to an employee of the
school district or any threats to the school, other students, or school
personnel. Second, if the off-campus speech reaches campus, the school
should be permitted to punish those students who bring that speech onto
campus. To illustrate, consider J S. ex rel. Snyder and Wisniewski, where the
speech was only brought on campus by a student who did not originate the
speech. The student who created the profile (the original speaker) may not
have said a word about the profile while on campus. The school can punish
those students who talk about the profile while on school grounds but should
not be permitted to punish the original speaker. In the sleepover example
given earlier, the school could punish the friend who brings the girl's
comment on campus for repeating the speech, but it should not be able to
punish the original speaker.
A school should not be able to punish an off-campus speaker when the
effects of her speech reach the school's campus unless she is the one that
brings such speech onto campus or she intentionally directs it at the school.
A student who finds herself a victim of off-campus speech that is not
punishable by the school has other alternatives. While the school would not
be able to punish the speaker, the school could move either student to another
class, and the school could direct the student victim to recourse given by state
statutes, such as anti-bullying statutes.
III. How THE NORTH CAROLINA LEGISLATURE HAS REGULATED WHAT
SCHOOLS CANNOT
While schools are limited in what off-campus speech they can punish,
state legislatures can regulate what school districts cannot reach. Whether
such statutes are constitutional under the First Amendment is another
question.
142. See id ("Adults often say things that give rise to disruptions in public schools. Those
who championed desegregation in the 1950s and '60s caused more than a minor disturbance
in the southern schools. Of course, the prospect of using Tinker to silence such speakers is
absurd. But the absurdity stems . .. from the antecedent step of extending Tinker beyond the
public-school setting to which it is so firmly moored.").
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A. North Carolina's Anti-Cyberbullying Law
After thirteen-year-old Megan Meier's suicide in 2006, legislatures
across the country scrambled to enact anti-cyberbullying laws. 143 An adult
masquerading as a fellow student bullied Megan through a fake online
profile, ultimately causing Megan's suicide.144 There was no criminal
recourse for cyberbullying at the time of Megan's death, and the adults
behind the messages never faced any charges.' 45 Thus began a nationwide
campaign, spearheaded by Megan's mother, to end cyberbullying through
legislation and a shift in societal norms. 14 6
The North Carolina General Assembly in 2009 passed a statute
criminalizing cyberbullying.1 47 The statute made it unlawful for any person
to use a computer or network "[w]ith the intent to intimidate or torment a
minor" to: "[b]uild a fake profile or Web site"; pose as a minor in a chat
room, e-mail, or other instant messaging network; "[fJollow a minor online
or into an Internet chat room"; or "[p]ost or encourage others to post on the
Internet private, personal, or sexual information pertaining to a minor."1 4 8
The statute also outlawed "any statement, whether true or false, intending to
immediately provoke, and that is likely to provoke, any third party to stalk
or harass a minor." 4 9 The statute was passed in both the House and Senate
with overwhelming support.'so
Despite the almost unanimous votes in both houses, questions about the
constitutionality of the bill arose soon after its passage."' Phrases included
in the bill, such as "[w]ith the intent to intimidate or torment a minor" and
"likely to provoke," were called "remarkably vague," and the statute
notoriously failed to provide much guidance in measuring those
143. See Steve Pokin, 'My Space' Hoax Ends with Suicide ofDardenne Prairie Teen, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH (Nov. 11, 2007), https://perma.cc/S8GE-4VJL.
144. Id
145. Id
146. Id
147. Act of Aug. 28, 2009, no. 551, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 1510 (codified at N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 14-458.1 (2017)), invalidated by State v. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d 814, 822 (N.C. 2016).
148. § 14-458.1(a)(1). The statute made violations a Class 1 misdemeanor if the offender
was eighteen years or older. Id § 14-458.1(b). If the offender was younger than eighteen,
then a violation was a Class 2 misdemeanor. Id
149. Id § 14-458.1(a)(3).
150. The bill passed the House unanimously and passed the Senate with a 39-2 vote.
House Bill 1261/S.L. 2009-551, N.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY, https://perma.cc/4ASZ-YNVT.
151. See Bob Luebke, HB 1261: Cyberbullying Overreaction?, CIVITAS INST. (Aug. 14,
2009), http://perma.cc/Z4XT-CBLZ; see also Michael R. Gordon, Recent Development, The
Best Intentions: A Constitutional Analysis of North Carolina's New Anti-Cyberbullying
Statute, 11 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 48,49 (2009).
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thresholds. 15 2 For example, one scholar suggests the scenario where one
seventeen-year-old sends a message to another seventeen-year-old ex-lover
accusing that student of cheating in the relationship.' 53 Due to the ambiguous
language of the statute, it is unclear whether this message could have
criminal consequences.15 4 The North Carolina Supreme Court took up the
constitutionality of this statute in the 2016 case State v. Bishop.155
B. State v. Bishop-Striking Down North Carolina's Anti-Cyberbullying
Law
Robert Bishop, a student at Southern Alamance High School, was
charged under North Carolina's cyberbullying statute for using a computer
to "[p]ost or encourage others to post on the Internet private, personal, or
sexual information pertaining to a minor." 56  Other students, including
Bishop, "began to post negative pictures and comments" about a fellow
student, Dillion Price, to Facebook."' One student posted to Price's
Facebook profile a sexually charged text accidentally sent to him by Price.1 8
Both Price and Bishop commented on the post."' Price accused the student
who posted the picture of fabricating the text. 160 Bishop replied, saying the
text was "excessively homoerotic" and "accused others of being 'defensive'
and 'pathetic for taking the [I]nternet so seriously.""' Two other similar
Facebook posts about Price followed.1 62 Upon finding her son extremely
upset over the post, Price's mother contacted the police. 63  Bishop was
arrested and charged with one count of cyberbullying under section
14-458.1.164
152. § 14-458.1. Cf Eugene Volokh, It's Now a Crime in Louisiana to Electronically
Communicate With "Intent to ... Abuse [or] Torment" a Minor, VoLoKH CONSPIRACY (Jul.
9, 2010, 3:30 PM), http://perma.cc/JX7D-BLT3 (discussing a Louisiana statute utilizing
similar language to the North Carolina statute).
153. Volokh, supra note 152.
154. Id.
155. State v. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d 814 (N.C. 2016).
156. Id. at 815 (alteration in original) (quoting § 14-458.1(a)(1)(d)).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id
163. Id. at 816.
164. Id
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Bishop was found guilty at trial.165 Upon appeal to the Alamance
County Superior Court for a de novo trial, Bishop unsuccessfully argued that
the statute was unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments
of the United States Constitution.166 Bishop was convicted by a jury for the
second time. 16 7 He appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals, arguing
that the statute was unconstitutional under the First Amendment because it
applied a content-based restriction and failed strict scrutiny.168 The court of
appeals unanimously held the statute regulated conduct, not speech, and that
any burden on speech was "merely incidental."l 6 9
The North Carolina Supreme Court granted Bishop's petition for
discretionary reviewl70 and held section 14-458.1(a)(1)(d) of the North
Carolina General Statutes was unconstitutional.17 1 The court reasoned that
the statute regulated speech because it "outlawed posting particular subject
matter, on the [I]ntemet, with certain intent." 172 But, it continued, simply
because the speech took place online does not mean the speech is "subject to
any lesser protection." 1 73 The supreme court rejected the court of appeals'
rationale that the statute regulated conduct rather than speech. 174 The court
then had to determine whether the cyberbullying statute was content-based
or content-neutral. 7 5  It held the statute was content-based because it
regulated speech by subject matter: "The statute criminalizes some messages
but not others, and makes it impossible to determine whether the accused has
committed a crime without examining the content of his communication." 176
Content-based speech restrictions are subject to strict scrutiny.1 77 The
state must present a compelling interest and show that the law achieves that
interest by narrowly tailored means. The court held the cyberbullying law
did not satisfy this heightened review, stating:
165. Id
166. Id; U.S. CONsT. amend. I; id amend. XIV, § 1.
167. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d at 816.
168. Id.
169. State v. Bishop, 774 S.E.2d 337, 343-44 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015) ("[The] Statute
punishes the act of posting or encouraging another to post on the Internet with the intent to
intimidate or torment" a minor).
170. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d at 816.
171. Id at 817.
172. Id
173. Id. at 818.
174. Id at 818-19.
175. Id at 818.
176. Id at 819.
177. Id.
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[A]s to both the motive ofthe poster and the content ofthe posting, the statute
sweeps far beyond the State's legitimate interest in protecting the
psychological health of minors. Regarding motive, the statute prohibits
anyone from posting forbidden content with the intent to "intimidate or
torment" a minor. However, neither "intimidate" nor "torment" is defined
in the statute, and the State itself contends that we should define "torment"
broadly to reference conduct intended "to annoy, pester, or harass." The
protection of minors' mental well-being may be a compelling governmental
interest, but it is hardly clear that teenagers require protection via the criminal
law from online annoyance.178
The subject matter prohibited by the statute was "similarly expansive"
because it prohibited posting "private, personal, or sexual information
pertaining to a minor."17 9 These terms were not defined in the statute.18 0 The
State argued for a broad interpretation of "personal" as "of or relating to a
particular person."18 1  The court held, "Such an interpretation would
essentially criminalize posting any information about any specific minor if
done with the requisite intent."' 82 Not even a mens rea requirement could
sufficiently narrow the statute's scope to pass strict scrutiny.'8 3 Thus,
because the cyberbullying statute criminally punished an "alarming breadth"
of speech, it was ruled unconstitutional.1 84
C. North Carolina's Protection Against School Violence Act-Is it
Constitutional?
North Carolina has passed multiple anti-bullying statutes that are
vulnerable under the Bishop rationale. 8 ' The general assembly passed the
School Violence Prevention Act of 2012 to amend a similar act from 2009
178. Id at 821.
179. Id. (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.1(a)(1)(d) (2017)).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 474 (2010)).
185. See NC School Violence Prevention Act, no. 212, 2009 N.C. Sess. Laws 341
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115C-407.15 to -407.18 (2017)) (amending North Carolina
statutes concerning "[b]ullying and harassing behavior," "[p]olicy against bullying or
harassing behavior, "[p]revention of school violence," and "[c]onstruction of [the bullying]
statute"); see also Act of Oct. 22, 2015, no. 282, 2015 N.C. Sess. Laws 1376 (codified at § 14-
196.3) (amending North Carolina's cyberstalking statute); Act of July 14, 2000, no. 125, 2000
N.C. Sess. Laws 609 (codified at § 14-196) (amending North Carolina's statute regulating
harassment over the telephone).
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with the goal of promoting safer school environments.' This Act added a
new section punishing cyberbullying of a school employee by a student.'8
It is the first law in the nation to impose criminal sanctions on students
intending to intimidate or torment school employees online. 8 8
The School Violence Prevention Act uses language identical to the
statute struck down by the North Carolina Supreme Court in State v.
Bishop.' The only difference between the statutes is that one regulated
speech between students, while the other regulated speech between student
and employee.190
The North Carolina Supreme Court will likely do just what it did in
Bishop and hold section 14-458.2 unconstitutional because of its
impermissible restrictions on speech. 191 Schools do have a compelling
interest in protecting children from physical and psychological harm, but that
interest becomes less compelling as the victim becomes an adult.1 9 2 If
section 14-458.1 did not pass strict scrutiny, the fact that section 14-458.2
regulates speech between a student and adult employee makes the School
Violence Prevention Act even less likely to pass strict scrutiny.
The American Civil Liberties Union of North Carolina (ACLU)
criticized the 2012 act soon after it was passed.193 In its press release, it
stated the law
is too broad, threatens to chill students' free speech, sets a bad precedent by
telling students it's wrong to criticize government officials, and could saddle
students as young as 16 with up to 60 days in jail or a $1,000 fine for a wide
range of acts that do not merit a criminal punishment.194
186. School Violence Prevention Act of 2012, no. 149, § 4, 2012 N.C. Sess. Laws 715
(codified as amended at § 14-458.2). Originally named the "NC School Violence Prevention
Act," the original Act was passed into law in 2009. NC School Violence Prevention Act § 1.
Senator Tommy Tucker (R-Union County) introduced amendments to address computer-
related crimes in 2012 and renamed it the "School Violence Prevention Act of 2012." School
Violence Prevention Act of 2012, S. 707, 2011 Gen. Assemb. (N.C. 2011); see Gordon, supra
note 151.
187. § 14-458.2.
188. See New Law Criminalizing Online Student Speech Takes Effect Dec. 1, ACLU OF
N.C. (Nov. 28, 2012), http://perma.cc/9JKC-G64R.
189. § 14-458.2(b)(1)(b) ("Post or encourage others to post on the Internet private,
personal, or sexual information pertaining to a school employee."); State v. Bishop, 787
S.E.2d 814 (N.C. 2016).
190. § 14-458.2(b)(1).
191. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d at 822.
192. Id. at 820.
193. See New Law Criminalizing Online Student Speech Takes Effect Dec. 1, supra note
188.
194. Id.
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As the ACLU noted, the statute is so vague that simply criticizing a teacher
on the Internet could lead to criminal punishment. 195 Other parts of section
14-458.1 and section 14-458.2 are overbroad and stifle speech in violation
of the First Amendment. Section 14-458.2(b)(1)(a) makes it illegal for a
student to build a fake profile or website with the intent to intimidate or
torment an employee.' 9 6  These statutes, which rely on words such as
"harassment" and "hostile educational environment," give students and
parents almost no guidance on what kind of speech would and would not be
punishable by the state or school.1 97
The future of North Carolina's attempt to punish cyberbullying within
school environments does not seem optimistic. If the legislature is to take
on the task of regulating speech within the schoolhouse gates, it must pass
an even higher standard than a school must pass under the lesser Tinker
standard. A narrower and more specific law must exist.
The United States Department of Education issued a letter noting eleven
components found in current state laws tackling bullying and
cyberbullying.1 9 8 Including all eleven components is not enough to make a
criminal anti-bullying law constitutional, but incorporating certain
components might help to survive heightened scrutiny. A purpose statement,
explicit statement of the law's scope, narrow definition of prohibited
conduct, and clear enumeration of protected characteristics all help to narrow
the law's effects. North Carolina's anti-bullying legislation includes a
purpose statement and clearly enumerates protected characteristics, but the
legislature could improve on its scope section and definition of prohibited
conduct.
The North Carolina Supreme Court took issue with section 14-458.1's
vagueness and lack of definitions and specificity.' 99 The court's main
problem was no definition for the terms "intimidate or torment" and "to
annoy, pester, or harass"; it also took issue with the expansive sweep of
possible content subject to the law ("private, personal, or sexual information
195. Id.
196. N.C. GEN. STAT. §14-458.2(b)(1)(a) (2017).
197. Letter from Eugene Volokh, supra note 10, at 4.
198. Letter from Arne Duncan, Sec'y of Educ., U.S. Dep't of Educ. (Dec. 16, 2010),
https://perma.cc/82DY-72KU. The eleven components, which were attached to the letter,
were: (1) a purpose statement, (2) a statement of the law's scope, (3) specific descriptions of
prohibited conduct, (4) identification of specific protected characteristics, (5) development
and implementation of local school board policies, (6) components of a local school board
policies, (7) required review of local policies, (8) a communication plan notifying students,
family, and staff of the policies, (9) training and preventive education for staff, (10)
transparency and monitoring, and (11) statement of rights to other legal recourse. Id
199. State v. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d 814, 821 (N.C. 2016).
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pertaining to a minor"). 2 00 The legislature could borrow from other places
in the criminal code where such terms are defined. For example, harassment
defined under stalking includes "[k]nowing conduct, including written or
printed communication, . . . and electronic mail messages or other
computerized or electronic transmissions directed at a specific person that
torments, terrorizes, or terrifies that person and that serves no legitimate
purpose." 2 01 The legislature could require some showing of substantial
emotional distress by the person who receives those messages to further
narrow the scope.202
One other consideration could be useful in drafting a narrower law.
With a few short clicks, students have access to a large audience through
sites like Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, or MySpace.203 The Internet has
created a dichotomy in the types of audiences readily available to students.
It has opened the door for more direct one-on-one (or one-to-few) chats and
posts to the public at large. To whom the student directs his or her off-
campus speech should play a key role in deciding whether states can
constitutionally punish a student's off-campus speech.2 04 States should not
be allowed to punish students for speech they publish to the world at large
but should have more power to punish unwanted one-to-one or one-to-few
speech. 205 At the very least, a statute should be limited to the one-to-one or
one-to-many rationale.
The legislature might never be able to pass a law with as much authority
over bullying as it would like. But there are also other legal recourses for
speech beyond criminal laws-to wit, defamation and intentional infliction
of emotional distress. Some bullying may overlap with other criminal
violations like stalking or assault, too.
2 0 0. Id.
201. § 14-277.3A(b)(2).
202. See id (including a definition for substantial emotional distress under the stalking
statute).
203. Social media changes at a rapid pace. Often, the courts lag and decide cases involving
outdated social media platforms.
204. See Letter from Eugene Volokh, supra note 10 at 7 ("Schools might also be able to
prohibit unwanted one-to-one communication by one student to another student, when the
target has said he doesn't want to hear more from the speaker." (citing Rowan v. U.S. Post
Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970))).
205. See id ("But this exception is limited to one-to-one statements (or perhaps one-to-a-
few statements when all the listeners have told the speaker to stop). It can't be used to justify
suppressing speech among willing communicators-even when the speech is offensive to a
third party, for instance when it reveals accurate information about a romantic or sexual
relationship involving the third party-or speech addressed to the public at large, as on a Web
site of T-shirt.").
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CONCLUSION
Tinker should only apply to on-campus student speech, with two
exceptions: speech intentionally targeted at the school and students who
bring the off-campus speech on campus. While not perfect, this rule provides
more protection for freedom of speech. On the other hand, state legislatures
can punish certain off-campus speech that a school cannot reach under
Tinker. North Carolina has attempted to do this by passing various
anti-bullying statutes, but under the Bishop rationale, some of these statutes
are vulnerable to invalidation. The North Carolina General Assembly should
more carefully define words such as "harass" included in the statute and
make a clear distinction between one-to-one versus one-to-many speech to
narrow the parameters of anti-bullying laws.
Hannah Wallace*
* J.D. Candidate 2019, Campbell University School of Law. The author would like to thank
Campbell Law Review Volume 40 editors and staff for preparing this Comment for
publication. She would especially like to thank Jordan Spanner, Ally Mashburn, Monique
Kreisman, Brian Castro, and Chris Moore. Most importantly, the author would like to thank
Professor Greg Wallace: a great father, a tough constitutional law debater, and her biggest
softball fan.
2018] 733
27
Wallace: Reading, 'Riting, and Regulating Speech: Why Schools Can't Punish
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 2018
